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TORTS- NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION- COLLEGE LIABILITY- STUDENT IN-
TOXICATION INJURY-The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has held that a college has no liability for prima facie
negligence when students consume alcohol at an off-campus, college-
sponsored, extracurricular activity which results in student injury.
Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.
Ct. 1836 (1980).
On April 13, 1975, Donald Bradshaw was severely injured1 when the
vehicle in which he was riding struck a parked car on Union Street2 in
the borough of Doylestown, Pennsylvania. Bradshaw and Bruce Raw-
lings, driver of the vehicle, were eighteen-year-old students at Dela-
ware Valley College and were returning from the annual sophomore
class picnic when Rawlings lost control of his vehicle while proceeding
through a series of drainage dips.
3
The class picnic was held at a grove owned by the Maennerchor
Society' on the outskirts of the borough. The faculty advisor to the
sophomore class5 participated with the class officers in planning the
picnic and cosigned a blank check for class funds, which was later used
to purchase beer. The class president, who was under twenty-one, the
legal drinking age in Pennsylvania,6 purchased the beer from Marjorie
Moyer trading as Sunny Beverages. Flyers announcing the picnic and
featuring drawings of beer mugs, mimeographed by the college dupli-
cating facility, were prominently displayed across campus. Neither the
faculty advisor nor any other faculty member attended the picnic at
1. As a result of the collision, Bradshaw suffered a cervical fracture which caused
quadriplegic paralysis. Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 137 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 1836 (1980).
2. Union Street is also known as "Dip Street" because of drainage culverts or dips
designed in the roadway to carry surface water runoff. Id. at 137.
3. Id.
4. The Maennerchor Society was also named a defendant but was not a party to the
Third Circuit appeal. 612 F.2d at 137 & n.3.
5. The college had authorized the class' election of a faculty advisor, whose function
was to encourage social activities and to offer advice in the planning when needed. Brief
for Pennsylvania Association of Colleges and Universities and of American Council on
Education, Amici Curiae, in support of Defendant Delaware Valley College at 8, Bradshaw
v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Amici Curiae].
6. See 47 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4-493(1) (Purdon 1969), which reads in pertinent
part: "It" shall be unlawful-. . . (1) For any licensee ... or any other person to sell, fur-
nish or give any liquor or malt or brewed beverages ... to any person visibly intoxicated,
or to any insane person, or to any minor .... " Minor is defined in the General Provisions
of the state's Consolidated Statutes as "an individual under the age of 21 years." 1 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1991 (Supp. Pamp. 1964-1979).
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which beer was consumed by underage students. Rawlings was at the
picnic for a number of hours. Bradshaw testified that Rawlings had
been drinking and another witness expressed his opinion that Raw-
lings was under the influence of alcohol when he left the picnic.' Raw-
lings testified that he had no recollection of what occurred from the
time he left the picnic until after the accident.8
Bradshaw9 brought a diversity action"0 in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania," naming as defendants
the driver Rawlings, the borough of Doylestown, Marjorie Moyer, and
Delaware Valley College. Plaintiff alleged that Rawlings was negligent
in operating the vehicle, the borough of Doylestown was negligent in
allowing its roadway to remain in a known dangerous and defective
condition, Marjorie Moyer was negligent in knowingly furnishing alco-
hol to minors, and Delaware Valley College was negligent in failing to
supervise the picnic.12
In a bifurcated jury trial,13 the district court submitted to the jury
the issues of whether each defendant was negligent and whether each
defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in causing Bradshaw's
injuries. The court instructed the jury that it could find the college
liable if it had failed to "use due care under the circumstances to pre-
vent an unreasonable risk of harm to the persons under 21 at the pic-
nic." 5 The jury found the college, liquor licensee, borough, and driver
all liable for Bradshaw's injuries." The college, liquor licensee, and
7. 612 F.2d at 137. Before allowing the evidence of Rawlings' consumption of alcohol
to go to the jury, the district court determined at a preliminary hearing that there was
sufficient evidence for the jury to find that his consumption of beer at the picnic rendered
him unfit to drive. Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 464 F. Supp. 175, 179 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1836 (1980). See Mor-
reale v. Prince, 435 Pa. 51, 258 A.2d 508 (1969).
8. 612 F.2d at 137.
9. Carole and Alfred Cuneo, Bradshaw's mother and stepfather, joined Bradshaw as
plaintiffs. Id. at 137 n.1. In this casenote, however, the singular "plaintiff" refers to Brad-
shaw.
10. Plaintiff Bradshaw was a resident of New Jersey and the defendants were
residents of Pennsylvania. The amount in controversy was over $10,000. Brief for
Plaintiffs-Appellants at 12, Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979) [hereinafter
cited as Brief for Plaintiffs]. Thus, the requirements for federal diversity jurisdiction were
met. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
11. 464 F. Supp. at 178.
12. Id. at 179. Saab Motor Company, vehicle manufacturer, and Gilbert Rawlings,
owner of the Saab driven by defendant Rawlings were originally named as defendants but
were voluntarily dismissed by plaintiff. Id. at 178 n.4.
13. Id. at 178. The trial was bifurcated on the issues of liability and damages. The
jury found Bradshaw's damages to be $1,108,067. Id.
14. Id. at 178 n.2.
15. Answering Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 25, Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d
135 (3d Cir. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Answering Brief for Plaintiffs].
16. 464 F. Supp. at 178.
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borough then filed post-trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict or for a new trial.17
To support its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the
college argued that it had no duty to supervise the picnic unless it
knew or had reason to know that the activity would be dangerous."
The college relied on Rubtchinsky v. State University of New York, 9
in which a New York court held that a college had no legal duty to
supervise a pushball game conducted as part of its freshman orienta-
tion program.0 The district court, however, found that decision in
Rubtchinsky to be limited to a finding that no legal duty existed under
those particular facts, stressing the New York trial court's finding that
the injured student assumed the risk of injury from participation in
the game.2 The district court reasoned that the college's regulation
prohibiting consumption of alcohol by students was evidence that the
college recognized the danger of beer drinking by underage students.'
In addition, to support its conclusion that a college can be charged
with a duty to supervise off-campus school-sponsored activities, the
district court cited Chappel v. Franklin Pierce School District,' where
a duty of due care in supervising extracurricular activities was imposed.
In Chappel, as in Bradshaw, a faculty advisor participated in planning
17. Id at 178 n.1. The plaintiff also filed a post-trial motion for a new trial on the
issue of damages only. Id. at 178 n.1, 183-84.
18. Id at 180. In his brief to the Third Circuit, the plaintiff alleged that the college
actively promoted the picnic in spite of the knowledge that beer would be consumed by
students attending. Brief for Plaintiffs at 4.
The college had requested a jury charge that it had no duty to supervise the picnic
unless it had actual or constructive notice that injury might result to students attending.
The district court did charge the jury that "[t]he College would have had to have some
knowledge that there was going to be a problem at the picnic with alcohol before it can be
held liable here." Answering Brief for Plaintiffs at 29.
19. 46 Misc. 2d 679, 260 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Ct. Cl. 1965). In Rubtchinsky the college had
conducted pushball games as part of its freshman orientation program for a period of 38
years without any serious student injury. Id. at 681, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
20. See note 97 infra.
21. 464 F. Supp. at 180.
22. Id. at 180-81. The regulation provides in pertinent part: "Possession or consump-
tion of alcoholic or malt beverages on the property of the College or at any College spon-
sored or related affair off campus will result in disciplinary action. The same rule will apply
to every student regardless of age." 612 F.2d at 141.
23. 71 Wash. 2d 17, 426 P.2d 471 (1967). In Chappel, the plaintiff, a high school stu-
dent, was injured during his initiation into a school sponsored club. Because the club was
open only to students with good grades, the plaintiff argued that it had some academic
value. The faculty advisor participated in planning a hazing-type initiation off the school
premises and then did not attend the ceremony. An unwritten school rule prohibited haz-
ing as well as off-premises initiations. In addition the faculty advisor admitted that if he
had attended, he would have prohibited the activity which caused the plaintiff's injury. Id.
at 19, 426 P.2d at 473.
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the school-sponsored off-campus activity and then failed to attend.'
The district court concluded that the jury could find that the college
had acted unreasonably by failing to supervise the picnic in view of the
risk that alcohol would be consumed.' Thus the district court denied
Delaware Valley College's post-trial motions, holding that the issue of
the college's liability was properly submitted to the jury.26
On direct appeal by the borough, college, and liquor licensee, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit' affirmed the
verdict against the licensee and borough, but reversed the verdict
against Delaware Valley College, and directed judgment in its favor.'
The Third Circuit held that there was no legal duty owed by the col-
lege to the plaintiff under the circumstances of this case and, thus, no
prima facie case of negligence against the college.'
Judge Aldisert, writing for the three-judge panel, addressed
whether the college owed a duty of due care by examining whether the
student's interest was entitled to legal protection from the college's
conduct. To answer this question the court balanced the competing in-
terests of the student in remaining free from injury and of the college
in avoiding duties which it is incapable of performing."
Beginning with the premise that a college is not the insurer of the
safety of its students, the court noted the recent expansion of student
rights3 1 and privileges, ,and the corresponding limitations on the
authoritarian role of modern colleges.2 To illustrate its view that col-
lege students today are no longer minors,3 the court pointed out that a
24. Id
25. 464 F. Supp. at 181. The district court noted that the college was allowed to de-
fend on the grounds that it was unable to prevent beer drinking by the students, but that
the jury was entitled to reject this defense. Id.
26. Id at 182.
27. On the panel were Circuit Judges Aldisert and Hunter, and District Judge
Meanor of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, sitting by
designation. 612 F.2d at 136.
28. Id. at 144.
29. Id at 143.
30. Id. at 137-38. The court stressed the fundamental premise of tort law that "a
negligence claim must fail if based on circumstances for which the law imposes no duty of
care on the defendant." Id. at 138. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 53
(4th ed. 1971).
31. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (high school student's fourteenth amend-
ment due process rights infringed by 10-day suspension from school without a hearing);
Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (college student's first amendment rights
violated by dismissal for distribution of an allegedly obscene newspaper); Tinker v. Des
Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (high school student has first amendment right to
wear black armband to school in silent protest of the Vietnam War).
32. 612 F.2d at 138.
33. Id. at 139.
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constitutional amendment has given eighteen-year-olds the right to
vote,u and that Pennsylvania treats eighteen-year-olds as adults in
many areas of public employments and in its criminal justice system.3
Noting that there was a time when colleges stood in loco parentis to
their students because students were considered minors, the court
found that this role was dramatically changed by the campus revolu-
tions of the Sixties. 7 The reapportionment of interests resulted in stu-
dent acquisition of the right to regulate their own lives and concur-
rently limited the college's ability to regulate student life on and off
campus.' To illustrate the changed roles of colleges and students, the
court quoted Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Healy v. James,3
in which he noted that students are adult members of the college com-
munity and have values different from those traditionally held by col-
leges.'
After concluding that modern college students are adults, and not
minors, the court distinguished cases which had imposed tort liability
on elementary and high schools for off-premises injury to their stu-
dents. 1 The court conceded that Pennsylvania might choose to impose
a legal duty to supervise off-campus activities on schools with younger
students, but held that where the students have reached the age of
majority, the rule would be different. Thus, the court went on to
assess the competing interests of the parties in this case. 2
The court noted that Bradshaw bore the burden of presenting evi-
34. I& at 138-39 & n.7. The twenty-sixth amendment to the Constitution provides:
"The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age."
U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
35. 612 F.2d at 139. The court noted inter alia that 18-year-olds in Pennsylvania may
be public accountants, veterinarians, or firemen, and may drive trucks and ambulances.
Id-
36. Id In Pennsylvania, subject to limited exceptions, 18-year-olds are tried as adults
in criminal court and cannot be tried in juvenile court. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6302,
6303-6308 (Purdon Pamp. 1980).
37. 612 F.2d at 139.
38. Id at 140.
39. 408 U.S. 169 (1972). The Court in Healy held that the college's denial of official
campus recognition of a local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) was a
prior restraint on free speech. Thus, the college had a heavy burden to show need for the
restraint. Id at 183-84.
40. 612 F.2d at 140.
41. Id See Chappel v. Franklin Pierce School Dist., 71 Wash. 2d 17, 426 P.2d 471
(1967); MeLeod v. Grant County School Dist., 42 Wash. 2d 316, 255 P.2d 360 (1953) (twelve-
year-old student raped by fellow students on the high school premises in an unlocked,
darkened closet during a noon recess when students were left without adult supervision,
contrary to the school's own regulation).
42. 612 F.2d at 140-41.
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dence of the existence of a duty owed to him by the college." To sup-
port the existence of a duty, Bradshaw offered the college's own
regulation prohibiting consumption of alcohol on or off its premises by
any of its students." The court predicted that Pennsylvania courts
would hold this regulation insufficient to infer that the college volun-
tarily assumed the role of custodian over its students to prevent injury
to them resulting from violation of its rule. 5
The court next examined whether a special relationship existed as a
matter of law between a college and its students sufficient to impose
upon the college a duty to control the conduct of a student operating a
car off-campus, or a duty to extend to a student a right of protection in
transportation to and from off-campus activities."6 The court concluded
that Bradshaw failed to meet his burden of proving such a duty. Brad-
shaw's primary argument was that the college knew the students
would drink beer at the picnic, that this conduct created a known risk
of harm, and that because of this knowledge the college had a duty to
either control Rawlings' conduct or protect Bradshaw from harm.
Recognizing that no Pennsylvania decision had addressed this precise
issue, 7 the court noted that in Manning v. Andy" the Pennsylvania
43. Id. at 141.
44. See note 22 supra.
45. 612 F.2d at 141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 (1965) provides:
One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of another
under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal power of self-
protection or to subject him to association with persons likely to harm him, is
under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control the conduct of third persons
as to prevent them from intentionally harming the other or so conducting
themselves as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to him, if the actor
(a) knows or has reason to know that he had the ability to control the conduct
of the third persons, and
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such
control.
Id.
46. 612 F.2d at 141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965) provides:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from
causing physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which im-
poses a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the
other a right to protection.
Id.
47. 612 F.2d at 141. It is not clear which issue the court was addressing. The court's
statement that it knew of no Pennsylvania decision addressing "this precise issue" followed
its definition of the issue as a college's "duty to control the conduct of a student operating
a motor vehicle off campus or a duty to extend to a student a right of protection in
transportation to and from off-campus activities." Id
48. 454 Pa. 237, 310 A.2d 75 (1973). In Manning an employer served alcohol to a
visibly intoxicated employee at an office party. The complaint charged that the employer
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Supreme Court refused to find a private host liable to third persons in-
jured as a consequence of his guest's intoxicated driving. Judge
Aldisert predicted that because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
refused to recognize a special relationship between a private host and
an intoxicated guest, it would be even less willing to find a relation-
ship between Bradshaw and the college in this case."9
The court next addressed Bradshaw's argument that beer drinking
by underage college students itself creates a special relationship on
which to predicate liability, and that the college had the ability to ex-
ercise control over beer drinking by underage students at the picnic.'
The court stated that these contentions blurred the distinction be-
tween establishing the existence of a duty and proving a breach of duty.
The court noted that the plaintiff did not argue that beer drinking is
generally regarded as a harm-producing act because, in the court's
view, it is an activity commonly indulged in by citizens and college
students. In addition, the court pointed out that in many states,5' in-
cluding neighboring New Jersey,52 the legal drinking age is under
twenty-one. Under these circumstances, the court believed that imposi-
tion of a duty in this case would place an impossible burden on the col-
lege. The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima
facie case against the college that it should be charged with a duty of
custodial care. '
was negligent per se because the Liquor Code makes it unlawful for any person to furnish
alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person. See note 6 supra. The Manning court held,
however, that the Liquor Code was only intended to regulate persons in the liquor trade
and could not be used to impose civil liability on private hosts for off-premises injuries to
third parties. Because the allegations were based on the statutory violation alone, the
court found no error in the trial court's dismissal of the complaint against the employer.
454 Pa. at 239, 310 A.2d at 76.
49. 612 F.2d at 141.
50. Id. at 142. Plaintiff argued that the college was able to and did prevent beer
drinking at subsequent class picnics. Answering Brief for Plaintiffs at 26.
51. 612 F.2d at 142 & n.33. The court examined the legal drinking ages in Austria,
Denmark, England, Wales, and Germany as well as noting that only 13 states still retain
the 21 year age requirement for beer. Id. at 142 nn.32 & 33.
52. Delaware Valley College is located less than ten miles from the New Jersey state
line. Brief for Appellee Delaware Valley College at 4, Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135
(3d Cir. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Brief for College]. The drinking age in New Jersey was
18 at the time of the Bradshaw decision. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17B-1 (West 1976). The
statute was amended, effective Jan. 2, 1980, deleting "minor" and inserting "person under
the legal age for purchasing alcohol." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-81 (West Supp. 1980). The
amendment was intended to facilitate raising the legal drinking age. Id.
53. 612 F.2d at 143. The court noted that New York has also refused to impose liability
upon a college under similar circumstances. Id. at 142-43. See Mintz v. New York, 47
A.D.2d 570, 362 N.Y.S.2d 619 (1975) (memorandum decision) (students drowned during
college-sponsored canoe trip); Rubtchinsky v. State Univ. of N.Y., 46 Misc. 2d 679, 260
N.Y.S.2d 256 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (student injured in college-sponsored pushball game).
1981
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Turning next to the liability of the defendant liquor licensee, Mar-
jorie Moyer, the court found that she was liable for injuries proximately
resulting from her sale of the beer to the minors, absent special cir-
cumstances removing her from the general rule of Jardine v. Upper
Darby Lodge." The licensee argued that the evidence of Rawlings' in-
toxication was insufficient to establish proximate cause. The court
determined that sufficient evidence existed to submit the issue of the
driver's intoxication to the jury," and although a student of legal age
signed for the beer, the distributor had reason to know that the ma-
jority of consumers were underage.'
The court next addressed the liability of the borough of Doylestown.
The borough argued that it could not be found liable for Bradshaw's in-
juries because the negligence of defendant Rawlings was a superseding
cause 57 as a matter of law. The Third Circuit rejected the borough's
argument, agreeing with the district court that under Pennsylvania
law, causation is properly a matter for the jury to decide.58 In addition,
the borough argued that it could not be charged with failure to warn
this defendant of the hazard because Rawlings was familiar with the
54. 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964). In Jardine the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
found a liquor licensee who served a visibly intoxicated customer liable for third party in-
juries incurred as a result of the customer's drunken driving. The court relied on the com-
mon law concept of negligence per se encompassed in RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934)
which provides: "The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by
failing to do a required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an interest of another
if... (b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect ..
The Liquor Code was amended after Jardine to provide:
No licensee shall be liable to third persons on account of damages inflicted upon
them off of the licensed premises by customers of the licensee unless the customer
who inflicts the damages was sold, furnished or given liquor or malt or brewed
beverages by the said licensee or his agent, servant or employee when the said
customer was visibly intoxicated.
47 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4-497 (Purdon 1969). See Simon v. Shirley, 409 A.2d 1365 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1979) (licensee had no civil liability for violating the Liquor Code by serving a
minor, because it was conceded that the minor was not visibly intoxicated when served).
55. See note 7 supra.
56. 612 F.2d at 143.
57. A superseding cause is: "An act of a third person or other force which by its in-
tervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another which his antecedent
negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1607 (rev.
4th ed. 1968).
58. 612 F.2d at 143. See Estate of Flickinger v. Ritsky, 452 Pa. 69, 75, 305 A.2d 40, 43
(1973) (Pennsylvania Supreme Court defined the test for superseding cause as whether a
reasonable man would consider the intervenor's action as extraordinarily negligent or
whether a reasonable man in the position of the original actor should have foreseen that
an intervenor's negligence might cause harm). See also Miller v. Checker Yellow Cab Co.,
465 Pa. 82, 348 A.2d 128 (1975); Pushnik v. Winky's Drive-In Restaurants, Inc., 242 Pa.
Super. Ct. 323, 363 A.2d 1291 (1976), allocatur refused.
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dips in Union Street. The court found that this argument must fail
because the plaintiff had supplied sufficient evidence against the
borough on an alternate theory. From the evidence the jury could find
that the borough was negligent in creating and maintaining the dips,
which presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the public.9
Finally, the court considered Bradshaw's cross appeal' which charged
error in the district court's refusal to allow Bradshaw's expert, an
economist, to include in his estimate of future damages" a projected
percentage increase in both wages and nursing costs. 2 Bradshaw
argued that the court should not apply the Pennsylvania Superior
Court case of Havens v. Tonner," which held that projected wage in-
creases based on extrapolation from past economic trends are too
speculative for a jury to consider in estimating future damages. In re-
jecting this argument, the Third Circuit relied on its statement in Viz-
zini v. Ford Motor Co." that Havens stands for the rule that predicted
increases in costs or wages based on past inflationary trends are inad-
missible in Pennsylvania damage awards." The Bradshaw court con-
cluded that the district court properly excluded plaintiffs productivity
factor."
59. 612 F.2d at 143.
60. The court addressed the issue raised in the plaintiff's cross appeal even though it
was not sure if the plaintiff would still press his cross appeal in view of its partial rever-
sal of the district court's judgment. Id. at 144.
61. On appeal to the Third Circuit, the plaintiff also charged as error the district
court's denial of his request to supplement the record with a more detailed offer of proof
on the foundation for his figures. The plaintiff argued that he could remove the
speculative nature of such figures only if the economist could detail the accuracy of his
predictions. Brief for Plaintiffs at app. 4.
62. 612 F.2d at 144. Based on predictions from past inflationary trends, the economist
wanted to include in his calculations a 21/2%/o increase in productivity which would be
reflected in a yearly increase in plaintiff's wages, and a 31/2% increase in the cost of nurs-
ing care per year. Brief for College at 47.
63. 243 Pa. Super. Ct. 371, 365 A.2d 1271 (1976), allocatur refused. The relevant issue
in Havens was whether it was error to allow plaintiffs economist to use a 31/z% produc-
tivity factor in calculating lost future earnings. The court in Havens held that it was
reversible error to include this factor and ordered retrial on the damage issue only. Id. at
380-81, 365 A.2d at 1275. See also Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973);
Frankel v. Heym, 466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972); Magill v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 464
F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1972). Until the Havens decision, these cases had been cited together for
the proposition that, in the Third Circuit, inflation factors may be admitted if sufficiently
proved. See Note, Future Inflation, Prospective Damages, and the Circuit Courts, 63 VA.
L. REV. 105 (1977). Subsequent to Bradshaw, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
rejected Havens and directed that lost future productivity should be considered in com-
puting lost future earnings. Kaczokowski v. Bolubasz, 421 A.2d 1027 (Pa. 1980).
64. 569 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1977).
65. 612 F.2d at 144.
66. Id.
1981
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An understanding of the court's rationale in Bradshaw is impeded
by the court's failure to state clearly the legal duty being addressed.
In the course of its opinion, the court referred to several possible
duties, including a duty to control students in operating motor vehi-
cles,6 7 a duty to provide safe transportation to and from off-campus ac-
tivities," and a duty to prevent student beer drinking. 9 Thus, the
general issue addressed by the Bradshaw court appears to be whether
the college had a legal duty to act to protect students attending a
college-sponsored extracurricular activity.7" The plaintiff's argument,
however, was focused on the narrower issue of whether the college
had the specific duty to provide faculty supervision at the picnic. The
plaintiff charged that the college knew its students would consume
beer at the picnic, but actively promoted the picnic in spite of a
foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm to students attending,71 and
then failed to take the precaution of having a faculty member in attend-
ance.
72
Further interpretive difficulty arises from the Bradshaw court's
failure to distinguish between a duty to exercise control over student
conduct as a means of protecting students and a duty to exercise con-
trol by faculty supervision. 7 Even if there were a duty to exercise
some control to prevent students from using college funds to purchase
beer illegally, the college did take some affirmative action. It had a
school rule which was punishable by disciplinary action,7 and its facul-
ty advisor testified that he admonished students, when he cosigned the
blank check, that they could not serve beer at the picnic. 5
In previous cases charging schools with inadequate supervision of
school-related activities, courts have begun their search for a legal duty
with a direct inquiry into the nature of the activity and the conduct
67. Id. at 141.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 142.
70. The lower court charged the jury:
Delaware Valley College's liability if any, is not predicated upon the furnishing of li-
quor. It's predicated on-let me put it this way, you may find that it failed to use
due care under the circumstances to prevent an unreasonable risk of harm to the
persons under 21 at the picnic.
Answering Brief for Plaintiffs at 25.
71. 612 F.2d at 141.
72. Answering Brief for Plaintiffs at 26.
73. Supervision is never mentioned in the court of appeals' opinion. The failure of a
faculty member to attend the picnic is mentioned only in the court's brief statement of the
facts. Id. at 137.
74. See note 22 supra.
75. Brief for Amici Curiae at 8.
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which resulted in student injury. 8 Where the injured student was a
child of tender years, the standard of care against which the school's
conduct is measured is generally that of an ordinary prudent parent.
7 1
The courts then look to the facts and circumstances to determine
whether the school had notice of a need to supervise based on the
dangerousness of the activity and the capabilities of children of like
age, and whether the school had the ability and opportunity to control
the type of conduct which resulted in harm. 8 These are the same
elements necessary for the existence of a parental duty to control a
child's conduct"l and for the existence of a duty of a person having
custody of another to control the conduct of third persons.
Courts addressing the question of a college's liability for student in-
jury incurred during a college-sponsored activity have not clearly in-
dicated what standard of care is being used, but have also gone directly
into a factual discussion similar to the cases involving younger
students.' These courts have not explicitly used the special relation-
ship concept nor can it be determined from their rationale whether
they based their decisions implicitly on the existence of a special rela-
tionship, either because of a parent-child analogy or a custodial rela-
tionship, or on the negligence principles embodied in section 321 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts."
76. See, e.g., Martin v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 158 Cal. App. 2d 64, 322 P.2d 31
(1958) (school had no notice of a need to supervise high school students ordered to pull
weeds on school grounds because it was not a dangerous activity); Doktor v. Greenberg,
58 N.J. Super. 155, 155 A.2d 793 (1959), appeal denied, 31 N.J. 548, 158 A.2d 450 (1960)
(previous scuffle between students was insufficient to put a high school teacher on notice
of a need to restrain the students); Lawes v. Board of Educ., 16 N.Y.2d 302, 213 N.E.2d
667, 266 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1965) (school had no notice of a need to supervise a noon recess as
there had been no showing that snowball throwing would occur or that it would present a
danger to the students).
77. See, e.g., Ballard v. Polly, 387 F. Supp. 895, 899-900 (D.D.C. 1975) (school had a
legal duty to take precautions against small children wandering off the school playground
into a busy street).
78. See generally Hagenau, Penumbras of Care Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate, 9 J.L.
& EDUC. 201 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Hagenau].
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965).
80. See id. § 320.
81. See, e.g., Perkins v. State Bd. of Educ., 364 So. 2d 183 (La. App. 1979) (no college
liability for 34-year-old college student injured by striking his head on the bottom of a
swimming pool while practicing a surface dive after class). See also note 53 supra. Cf.
Stephenson v. College Misericordia, 376 F. Supp. 1324, 1328-29 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (no college
liability because the riding academy was not an agent of the college even though the col-
lege gave physical education credits for participating in the riding course).
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 321 (1965) provides:
§ 321. Duty to Act when Prior Conduct is Found to be Dangerous
(1) If the actor does an act, and subsequently realizes or should realize that it has
created an unreasonable risk of causing physical harm to another, he is under a duty
to exercise reasonable care to prevent the risk from taking effect.
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Section 314 of the Restatement states that a person has no duty to
exercise due care merely because he realizes that action is necessary
for another's protection." Section 314A, however, states that the ex-
istence of a special relationship between an actor and an injured third
party can give rise to a duty to aid or protect that third party." The
school-student relationship is notably absent from the specifically
recognized special relationships in section 314A. 5 There is, however, a
caveat to this section in which the drafters express no opinion as to
whether other special relationships might exist. 6 Section 315 of the
Restatement states another general rule that no duty to control the
conduct of third persons exists absent a special relationship between
the actor and the third person or between the actor and the person to
be protected."' Sections 316 through 320 list other relationships which
have been recognized as special for the purposes of imposition of a duty
to control third party conduct. Again the school-student relationship is
absent from the list, although a comment to section 320 mentions that
teachers or other persons in charge of a public school are included in
the custodial special relationship."
The Bradshaw court began with an implicit recognition that the col-
lege had no duty to exercise due care even if it realized that action
was necessary for student protection. 9 In its search for a special rela-
tionship between a college and its students, the court first determined
that a modern college does not stand in loco parentis to its students,"
thus eliminating the parent-child special relationship. It also determined
that the college-student relationship could not reasonably be viewed as
depriving the student of his normal power of self-protection and,
therefore, was not within the custodial special relationship. The court
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies even though at the time of the act the
actor has no reason to believe that it will involve such a risk.
id-
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965) provides: "The fact that the actor
realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protec-
tion does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action." Id
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965).
85. Section 314A recognizes the special relationship between a common carrier and
his passengers, an innkeeper and his guests, a possessor of land and public invitees, and a
legal or voluntary custodian and his charge. Id.
86. Id.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965). See note 46 supra.
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 316-320 (1965) recognizes the special relation-
ships between a parent and his child, a master and his servant, a possessor of land and in-
vitees, persons in charge of third persons with known dangerous propensities and their
wards, and a voluntary or legal custodian and his charge. See also note 45 supra.
89. See 612 F.2d at 138.
90. Id. at 139-40.
91. Id. at 141. See also note 45 and accompanying text supra.
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then proceeded to examine whether the particular facts surrounding
Bradshaw's injury might give rise to a special relationship.2 To answer
this question, the court examined the nature of the activity and the
particular student conduct which resulted in harm,93 thus leading to a
factual inquiry very similar to the prior cases which did not explicitly
search for a special relationship.
A close look at the Bradshaw court's rationale reveals that lack of
notice of a need to exercise control over students was a significant fac-
tor in its ultimate determination that the school had no legal duty to
supervise the picnic. In analyzing the competing interests of modern
colleges and their students, the court discussed the modern legal
rights and privileges afforded persons over eighteen." The adult status
of eighteen-year-olds would also support the premise that it is reason-
able for a modern college to assume that its students will conduct
themselves as responsible adults. If this is reasonable, there should be
no legal duty to supervise students to ensure that they obey school
rules and state law, because there is no notice inferrable from the age
of students and a general view of their capabilities that they need
supervision. The court's reference to the societal acceptance of beer
drinking, and to the pervasiveness of student drinking," is also rele-
vant to the question of whether the college had notice of a need to
supervise. If beer drinking by persons over eighteen were dangerous,
and the college knew or should have known beer would be consumed,
the college might thereby have been on notice that its students needed
supervision. 97
The other factor the Bradshaw court considered important was the
college's inability to control student drinking off campus. The court
concluded that imposition of a duty on the college to control student
drinking would create an impossible burden. Again the court appears
to have confused the issue. The issue before the court was not whether
the college had a duty to control all student drinking, but rather
whether the college had a duty to supervise this school-sponsored pic-
92. 612 F.2d at 141.
93. Id. at 142.
94. Id. at 139-40.
95. The age and capabilities of students of like ages is always relevant to the stan-
dard of care of a school in negligent supervision cases. See generally Hagenau, note 78
supra.
96. 612 F.2d at 142.
97. This directly answers the college's argument that a college has no duty to super-
vise extracurricular activities "unless such activities are so inherently dangerous that the
College authorities are under actual or constructive notice that injuries may result to
students." Brief for College at 37 (quoting Rubtchinsky v. State Univ. of N.Y., 46 N.Y.
Misc. 2d at 681, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 259).
98. 612 F.2d at 142.
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nic and thereby control beer drinking at the picnic. Arguably, requir-
ing faculty supervision at this and similar college-sponsored events
would not have been particularly burdensome.9
By examining the nature of the activity, the Bradshaw court followed
the same line of inquiry used by other courts to determine whether a
school had a legal duty to supervise a student activity." The Brad-
shaw court did not hold that there is no special relationship between a
college and its students in general, but rather that there was no legal
duty to supervise this particular activity to prevent this particular
harm."' Viewed in light of the issue actually presented-whether the
college had a legal duty to supervise this picnic in light of all the facts
and circumstances -the holding in Bradshaw is only that this college
had no duty to provide faculty supervision for an off-campus, college-
sponsored social activity, even if it knew that beer would be consumed
by students.' 2
The question remains whether a duty to take affirmative action to
control student conduct would exist if a college took a more active role
in creating a situation where students were likely to be harmed by an
inherently dangerous activity or by the conduct of fellow students.
Under section 321 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, such a duty
would not depend on the existence of a special relationship between a
college and its students, but rather would depend on whether the col-
lege either created the risk initially or knew or should have known
that a change in circumstances had made the planned activity danger-
ous." 3 The college would then be under a duty to exercise reasonable
care to obviate the risk. The age of students involved would still be
relevant to the standard of care and to the reasonableness of the col-
lege's action in light of its students' capabilities."' Application of sec-
tion 321 to the Bradshaw facts reveals that since the college did not ac-
tively furnish beer to its students,'' it did not create the risk of harm,
99. See note 50 supra.
100. See note 76 and accompanying text supra.
101. 612 F.2d at 143.
102. The court specifically held that "Bradshaw failed to establish a prima facie case
against the college that it should be charged with a duty of custodial care as a matter of
law .. " Id.
103. See note 82 supra.
104. See note 95 supra. Even a parental duty to control a child's conduct depends on
the child's age, normally viewed as relevant to the element of notice of a need to super-
vise. See, e.g., Cooper v. Meyer, 50 1ll. App. 3d 69, 365 N.E.2d 201 (1977) (even though the
1-year-old was known to have assaulted persons in the past, no liability for the parent
who was absent from the home when a neighbor dropped by uninvited and was assaulted).
105. See note 70 supra.
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and, thus, should not be charged with a duty, because it was reason-
able to expect students to obey both its own rule' and state law. '
Whether there will ever be any difference in result if a court uses
the Bradshaw court's special relationship approach"0 8 to the duty issue
rather than the traditional approach of notice and ability to control,'
or the approach suggested by section 321 of the Restatement,'"0 re-
mains uncertain. Where a relationship does not fall within a previously
recognized category of special relationships, there is no clear indication
of what factors a court should consider to determine whether the rela-
tionship gives rise to a recognizable legal duty.
Perhaps the most significant element of the Bradshaw opinion is its
recognition that as the role of our educational institutions changes, the
law should recognize these changes as relevant to the scope of duties
assumed by educators and students alike.' Courts should not be too
willing to impose on one party to a relationship a legal duty to perform
a function which neither party expected it to perform. It is unlikely
that college students today expect their school administration to police
social activities or to protect them from their fellow students' intox-
icated driving. If the lower court's decision had stood, colleges would
have been forced to supervise all activities which they sponsored, and
students would have participated in these activities under the watchful
eye of the faculty. This situation would indeed conflict with the
modern notion of the role which colleges play in their students' social
lives. Explicit recognition of this anomaly can prevent future courts
from imposing a legal duty outside the scope of the relationship con-
templated by the parties themselves.
Rita Mankovich Irani
106. See note 22 supra.
107. See note 6 supra. The court's reference to Manning v. Andy as relevant to the
question of whether Pennsylvania would impose liability on the college is potentially con-
fusing since Manning involved a private host who actually served a visibly intoxicated
guest. See 612 F.2d at 141. See also note 48 supra. There was no allegation in Bradshaw
that the college itself had furnished the beer. See note 70 supra.
108. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).
109. See note 76 and accompanying text supra.
110. See note 82 supra.
111. 612 F.2d at 139-40.
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